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Abstract 
Theory of mind is said to be possessed by an individual if they impute mental states to 
others. Recently, some authors have argued that such mental state attributions mediate 
the gaze cueing effect in which observation of another individual shifts an observer’s 
attention. Employing a technique commonly used to assess mental state attribution in 
non-human animals, we assessed whether a gaze cue’s ability to see a target is 
necessary for an attention shift to occur.  In three experiments the gazing agent could 
either see the same thing as the participant (i.e., target) or had their view obstructed by 
a physical barrier. We found robust gaze cueing effects even when the observed agent 
in the display could not see the same thing as the participant. These results suggest 
that the attribution of ‘seeing’ is not necessary for the gaze cueing effect to occur. 
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Introduction 
In 1978 Premack and Woodruff published a landmark paper in which they introduced 
the Theory of Mind (ToM) concept. The authors stated that a ToM can be assumed to 
be possessed by an individual if they are able to impute mental states to themselves 
and others. Empirically, their paper solely concerned whether the chimpanzee is able 
to make such mental state attributions. Thus the ToM notion was originally used 
within an animal context and became a useful way of characterizing animal cognitive 
ability in a variety of species (e.g., Dally, Emery & Clayton, 2005; Penn & Povinelli, 
2007). Soon after Premack and Woodruff's paper appeared a number of 
developmental psychologists applied the ToM idea to human infants (e.g., Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983). A central concern was to identify the age at which humans acquire 
ToM and, more practically, whether ToM tests do indeed index a child's ability to 
infer the mental states of others. ToM has now been applied within a number of other 
contexts including, for instance, schizophrenia (Harrington & Siegert, 2005), autism 
(Baron-Cohen, 2000), altzheimer's disease (Gregory et al. 2002), decision-making 
(Torralva et al. 2007), and evolutionary psychology (Povinelli & Preuss, 1995). 
 
A number of authors have recently argued that mental state attributions occur during 
gaze cueing, in which the observation of where another person is looking influences 
perceptual processing in the observer (Nuku & Bekkering, 2008; Samson, Apperly, 
Braithwaite, Andrews, & Scott, 2010; Teufel et al., 2009; Teufel, Alexis, Clayton, & 
Davis, 2010; Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010). In the paradigm gaze cueing 
experiment a face is presented in the centre of a display with its eyes and/or head 
directed to the left or right. A target is then presented either at the gazed-at location or 
in the opposite hemifield. Results typically show that reaction time (RT) to determine 
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the identity or presence of a target is reduced when presented in the gazed-at position 
(Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Langton & Bruce, 1999). This is usually taken as 
evidence that seeing gaze triggers a shift of attention in the observer.  
 
The basic gaze cueing effect is highly robust, and many variations of this paradigm 
have been developed all aimed at understanding various aspects of social cognition 
(e.g., Frischen & Tipper, 2004; Hietanen, 2002; Kuhn, Tatler, & Cole, 2009). 
However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying the cueing effects remain 
controversial. The most common explanation suggests that gaze cueing is a 
reflective/bottom-up process that is driven by mechanics of eye deviation perception 
(e.g., Baron-Cohen 1995; Bayliss, di Pellegrino, & Tipper, 2004; Driver et al., 1999; 
Fernandez-Duque & Baird, 2005). According to this view, attention is shifted from 
the eyes because they deviate towards the gazed location. Contrasting this explanation 
is the mental state attribution account. Nuku and Bekkering (2008), for instance, have 
argued that gaze cueing occurs because the observer infers "that the agent is 
physically able to attend to the target". Indeed, not only does gaze indicate where a 
person is looking it also suggests that the individual is attending/perceiving something 
or someone at the gazed location. As Calder et al. (2002) additionally point out, gaze 
“implies that the person may have some intention or goal towards this particular 
object. In other words, gaze engages the mechanisms involved in the attribution of 
intentions and goals to others…”. Nuku and Bekkering based their conclusion on 
results from two variants of the gaze cueing procedure in which the agent's head was 
turned to the left or right. Critically, the agent's ability to see was manipulated by 
having its eyes closed versus open or being blocked out by a dark rectangle versus 
wearing sunglasses. Results showed larger cueing effects when the agent was able to 
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see the target. This clearly suggests that inferring the agent's mental state (i.e., 
‘seeing’ versus ‘not seeing’) influenced the degree to which the agent shifted the 
observer's attention.  
 
Teufel et al. (2010) and others (e.g., Caron, Butler, & Brooks, 2002) have however 
pointed out that the kind of design used by Nuku and Bekkering confounds potential 
mental state attribution and properties of the stimuli. Specifically, Nuku and 
Bekkering's experiments not only manipulated the agent's perception but also 
characteristics of the agent's eye region which may have generated the results 
obtained. Teufel et al. (2010) eliminated this potential confound by presenting agent's 
who wore mirrored goggles and participants were told that these individuals could 
either see or not see (i.e., the goggles were either transparent or opaque). Importantly 
therefore, the inducing stimuli were identical in both seeing conditions with only the 
participants belief being manipulated. As with Nuku and Bekkering's study, Teufel et 
al. observed greater gaze cueing when participants were informed that the agent could 
see. In a second experiment Teufel et al. manipulated the probability with which the 
face cued the target location such that the target was twice as likely to occur at the 
uncued location. It is known that gaze cues are able to shift attention even when an 
observer knows that a target is more likely to appear at a non gazed-at location (e.g., 
Driver et al., 1999). Teufel et al. found that participants were only able to voluntarily 
shift their attention away from the gazed location when told the agent could not see 
through the goggles. As with Nuku and Bekkering’s observations, this again suggests 
that gaze cueing is modulated according to whether the agent can see or not. In 
another study using mirrored goggles, Teufel et al. (2009) employed a gaze perception 
aftereffect in which prolonged exposure to a face gazing in one direction alters 
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subsequent perception of where a face is looking (Jenkins, Beaver, & Calder, 2006). 
Teufel et al. reported that this effect only occurred when the observer believed the 
agent could see through the goggles. 
 
Langton (2009) however, has urged caution in concluding that mental state attribution 
modulates gaze cueing. Langton suggests the possibility that the important attribution 
may concern whether the agent’s perceptual mechanisms are functioning or not rather 
than their mental state. Langton also makes the point that typical gaze cueing studies 
present an isolated gazer that is not actually looking at anything. This makes it 
difficult to attribute a genuine mental state to the agent. Furthermore, as Teufel et al. 
(2010) also points out, the mental state account does not concur with one of the basic 
findings from the large body of gaze cueing work; attentional shifts induced by a 
gazing agent appear to be largely reflexive. For example, gaze-cued shifts of attention 
are characterized by their rapid time-course and resistance to cognitive control (e.g., 
Driver et al., 1999). Furthermore, objects that have no mental state (e.g. a glove) but 
incorporate a pair of eyes are effective in shifting attention to the looked-at direction 
(e.g., Quadflieg, Mason, & Macrae, 2004) and gaze cueing is unaffected by cognitive 
load (Law, Langton, & Logie, 2009). These findings suggest that gaze cueing is 
largely controlled by bottom-up mechanisms with little contribution from higher 
processes that are responsible for mental state attribution.  
 
Clearly, humans often make explicit mental state attributions in social situations. For 
instance, when one wonders what another individual is looking at. However, the 
implication of applying ToM mechanisms to gaze cueing is that the attribution of a 
mental state to others is fast and involuntary. This notion has been made explicit by 
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Samson et al. (2010) who argued that humans rapidly and spontaneously compute the 
perspective of another individual. In their basic experiment an image of a room is 
shown. In the centre is a human avatar which is looking either towards the left-hand 
wall or the right-hand wall. The participant is asked to judge the number of discs 
located on the two walls and is required to do this either from their own perspective or 
the avatar’s perspective. Crucially, the experimenters manipulated consistency of the 
avatar’s and participant’s perspective; on some trials the avatar and participant could 
see the same number of discs whilst on other trials they could see a different number 
of discs. For example, if the avatar looked to the left-hand wall and one disc was 
located on each of the two walls, the avatar saw one disc and the participant, by virtue 
of seeing the whole room, saw two. By contrast, if two discs appeared on the left-hand 
wall and none of the right, both participant and avatar saw the same number of discs, 
i.e., two, both located on the left-hand wall. Samson et al.’s central results showed 
that RT to make the disc number judgment was reduced when the avatar’s viewpoint 
was consistent with the participant’s relative to when their viewpoints were 
inconsistent. Importantly, this occurred even when participants were told to ignore the 
avatar’s perspective. The authors concluded that these results are due to the discs 
being “seen by the other person” (original italics) and that computation of other 
people’s perspective occurs spontaneously.  
 
In addition to the behavioral work on gaze cueing and perspective taking, evidence for 
spontaneous ToM processes in social attention has come from neuroimaging studies. 
Whilst measuring blood flow from a number of brain areas including the medial 
prefrontal (MPF) cortex, Calder et al. (2002) presented observers with photographs of 
people whose eyes gazed in various positions. Participants were asked to indicate 
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whether the models had thick or thin eyebrows. Importantly therefore, observers were 
not asked to consider the mental state of the models; they were only asked to make a 
simple perceptual judgment. Results showed that direct gaze was particularly 
associated with activity in the fusiform gyrus. This can be expected given this 
region’s well known involvement in face processing (Kanwisher, Mcdermott, & 
Chun, 1997). More importantly however was the observation that averted gaze lead to 
greater activity in the MPF cortex. The significance of this is that the MPF region is 
thought to be concerned with inferring another person’s thoughts, goals and intentions 
(Frith & Frith, 1999). In other words, activity in a brain region associated with ToM 
was automatically activated when a person viewed averted gaze. 
 
The principal aim of the present work was to test whether the attribution of seeing is 
necessary for gaze cueing. To address this issue we conducted three gaze cueing 
experiments in which we manipulated the agent’s perspective by employing a 
technique commonly used in studies that assess mental state attributions of seeing in 
non-human animals (e.g., Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001). Animal behaviour work 
often uses a physical barrier positioned such that it either allows a stimulus to be seen 
or occludes it. For instance, a chimpanzee may be tested to determine whether it 
knows that another chimpanzee is unable to see a food item due to the position of the 
occluding barrier. Similarly, in the present work, rather than changing some aspects of 
the cueing agent we placed a physical barrier either side of the agent. On ‘non-seeing’ 
trials these barriers fully occluded targets presented to the left or right. By contrast, on 
‘seeing’ trials the barriers were moved so that they allowed the target to be seen. If the 
attribution of seeing is necessary for gaze cueing then the effect (as suggested by 
Teufel and others) should be abolished when the agent’s vision is restricted by the 
Comment [DTS1]: I wonder if this 
material is still necessary?   
The goal of the revised manuscript is to test 
the claim that the mental state of an avatar 
is an important in determining whether the 
avatar will elicit a shift of attention. We 
argue that previous studies are confounded 
by obscuring the eyes. We address the 
confound by manipulating the properties of 
the scene in such a way as to change the 
mental state of the avatar (i.e. we change 
the perspective of the avatar). It seems to 
me that we could move directly from the 
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our study. This way we don’t get bogged 
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 9 
barriers. Critically, Our use of physical barriers thus avoids potential confounds that 
arise when aspects of the gazing agent itself are manipulated such as when goggles 
are worn or the eyes are blanked out. 
 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 the cue was a photograph of a female model whose head and gaze 
was oriented to the side (see Figure 1). We also varied the interval between the onset 
of the cue and target to assess whether any mental state attribution effect changed 
over time. 
Method. 
Participants. Thirty-eight participants from the University of Essex took part in 
exchange for course credit.  
Stimuli and apparatus. The gaze cue agent was the head of a female aged 30. She 
looked out from a cardboard box that measured 18.9° in height and 12.8° in width. 
Door-like structures were incorporated into the sides of the box. When these doors were 
open the agent could look out to the sides but could not do so when closed. This 
manipulation therefore generated the seeing and non-seeing conditions. When gazing to 
the side the model was asked to also turn her head. The targets were black letters, S and 
H (3.5° high, 3.3° wide), that were placed to the left or right during the photographing. 
Thus the model was actually looking at the letters. We edited the photographs so that 
only the cardboard box, the model, and the target letters were visible. The experiment 
was driven by an eMac computer incorporating a CRT monitor. 
Design and procedure. A within-participant, 2 x 2 x 3 factorial design was used. The 
first factor manipulated cue validity (valid, invalid) and the second factor manipulated 
visibility (seeing, non-seeing). The third factor manipulated the SOA between the 
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appearance of the cue and target. The three levels were 100 ms, 400 ms, and 800 ms. In 
order to ensure that any mental state attribution did not need to be computed trial-by -
trial the visibility conditions were blocked and their presentation order counterbalanced. 
The SOA and validity manipulations were presented within block and presented in 
random order. The two blocks of trials in the experiment presented the (empty) 
cardboard box as background with a fixation point located in its middle. Participants 
were explicitly told that the face could either see or not see the target letter depending 
of which barrier was presented. They were informed of this at the beginning of each 
visibility block. Each trial began with the presentation of the model for 100, 400, or 800 
ms then the target. This display remained until response and the beginning of a trial was 
initiated by the participant’s response on the previous trial. Thirty-six valid and 36 
invalid trials were presented in both visibility blocks for each SOA, thus generating 432 
trials in total. The numbers of different trial types were balanced such that the number 
of target types and target locations were equated. The face validly cued the target 
location on 50% of trials. Twenty four practice trials were included. 
Results and discussion 
Data from two participants were excluded because their error rate was greater than 
20%. 3.4% of responses were defined as outliers using the same criterion described 
previously and omitted from further analysis. Figure 2 shows mean RTs for each 
condition. An ANOVA with validity, visibility and SOA as within-participants 
factors revealed a significant main effect of validity, F(1, 35) = 19.4, p < 0.001, = 
.36, and SOA, F(2, 70) = 51.1, p < 0.0001, = .59, but no significant main effect of 
visibility, F(1, 35) < 1. The interaction between validity and visibility was not 
reliable, F(1, 35) = 2.6, p > 0.11, neither was the three-way interaction, F(1, 35) <1. 
The interaction between validity and SOA was however significant, F(2, 70) = 13.1, p 
Comment [DTS2]: We need to describe 
the criterion here  
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< 0.001, = .27. With respect to the error rates, no effects were significant, all Fs < 
2.9, all ps > 0.05.  
 
The first notable aspect of these results is the presence of an overall gaze cueing 
effect. Participants were faster to identify the target when it appeared in the cued 
location. This replicates the many previous reports of eye gaze triggering a shift in an 
observer’s attention (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Langton & Bruce, 1999). The 
significant validity x SOA interaction is also in line with other gaze cueing studies 
demonstrating that the gaze cueing effect builds up over time (e.g., Driver et al. 
1999). Indeed, Figure 2 shows no cueing effect occurred at 100 ms SOA. Importantly 
however is the absence of any visibility effect on gaze cueing; this is demonstrated by 
the lack of visibility x validity interaction. The demonstration that the face cued 
attention despite having its vision restricted suggests that the mental state attribution 
of ‘seeing’ is not necessary for the gaze cueing effect.  Given the lack of a gaze effect 
at 100 ms SOA we performed additional analyses to assess any influence of visibility 
on the gaze effect in the 400 ms SOA condition. This condition may be the important 
condition to examine whether mental state influences gaze cueing because Teufel et 
al. (2010) observed modulation of gaze cueing at 400 ms SOA. Results however 
showed no significant interaction between validity and visibility, F(1, 35) = 1.9, p > 
0.17. Indeed, if one looks at the means only (see Figure 2) there is a larger cueing 
effect in the non-visible condition. This is also apparent in the 800 ms SOA condition. 
In sum, the results from Experiment 1 reveal a robust cueing effect but one that was 
not modulated according to whether the agent could see the target or not.  These data 
are not consistent with the claim that gaze cueing is contingent on the mental state of 
the avatar.  
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Experiment 2 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to assess our central question concerning mental 
state attribution and gaze cueing using a different behavioural measure to that used 
previously. In Experiment 1 we employed speeded motor responses to measure the 
gaze cueing effect. However, processes indexed by RT may be adversely affected by 
response noise. As Milliken and Tipper (1998) point out, “the act of measurement 
may contaminate the measurement itself’’ (p. 216). An alternative to measuring 
processes that involve response end mechanisms is to present stimuli under degraded 
conditions (e.g., brief displays) and measure accuracy of perception. Because such 
measurements involve participants making a purely perceptual decision, rather than 
emitting a speeded motor response, such measurements are less contaminated by 
response noise. The use of accuracy as a potentially more sensitive measurement 
compared with RT has previously been noted by many authors. For instance, Santee 
and Egeth (1982) suggested that under the ‘‘data limited’’ conditions (Norman & 
Bobrow, 1975) of briefly presented displays accuracy measures are more sensitive to 
perceptual processes (see also, Gellatly, Cole, Fox, & Johnson, 2003; Milliken & 
Tipper 1998; Rafal, Smith, Krantz, Cohen, & Brennan, 1990). Empirical support for 
this has come from Cole, Kuhn, Heywood, and Kentridge (2009) who showed that 
although colour “singletons” do not automatically attract attention when RT is used to 
index capture they do so when a ‘one-shot’ change detection method is used. 
 
In Experiment 2 therefore we employed a change detection task in which so-called 
change blindness is induced. Change blindness is the phenomenon whereby observers 
often fail to notice a change to a visual scene if the change is masked by simultaneous 
visual transients (e.g., Simons & Rensink, 2005). The rationale for our use of the 
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procedure is based on the link between attention and the degree to which change 
blindness is induced (e.g. Rensink, O' Regan, & Clark, 1997; Smith & Schenk, 2008). 
If a stimulus has attentional priority one should expect it to be less susceptible to 
change blindness relative to a stimulus that does not receive attentional priority (Cole, 
Kentridge, & Heywood, 2004; Cole, & Kuhn, 2009; Cole, & Kuhn, 2010; Pisella, 
Berberovic, & Mattingly 2004; Ro, Russell, & Lavie, 2001; Scholl, 2000; Smith & 
Schenk, 2008, 2010). Experiment 2 used the one-shot variant of the procedure in 
which the changed item occurred once only. Crucially, the change was either at a 
gazed-at location or elsewhere in the display. As with Experiment 1 the gazing agent 
could either see the same stimuli as the participant or not. 
Method. 
Participants. Eighteen undergraduate participants were recruited from Durham 
University.  
Stimuli and apparatus. The stimuli were based on those described for Experiment 1 
with the following exceptions. The agent gazed at one of four positions (top-right, top-
left, bottom-right, bottom-left). For non-seeing trials the barriers were green that 
obscured the agent’s vision of the probe stimuli. For the seeing trials windows appeared 
in the barriers which allowed the agent a clear view of the targets presented at the 
bottom and top positions. The stimulus letters were drawn from the set E, U, O, P, S, F, 
H, L, and A. Stimuli were generated using a Cambridge Research Systems ViSaGe 
graphics card and displayed on a 17-inch Sony Trinitron CRT monitor with a refresh 
rate of 100Hz. Responses were collected using a button-box with two response buttons. 
Participants were seated 57 cm from the monitor and the head was supported by a chin 
rest.   
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Design and procedure. A within-participant, 2 x 2 factorial design was used. The first 
factor manipulated cue validity (valid, invalid). The second factor manipulated 
visibility (seeing, non-seeing). Trials began with the appearance of the environment and 
a fixation point at the centre of the monitor for 1000 ms. The letter stimuli then 
appeared for 1000 ms, followed by the gaze cue, which was present for 100 ms. The 
entire stimulus array was then occluded by a black mask for 50 ms. This mask was 
replaced by the changed stimulus array and gaze cue, which was present until the 
participant responded. There was a 2000 ms inter-trial interval during which a fixation 
point was presented on a blank grey screen. Seeing and non-seeing trials were 
randomly interleaved. A total of 200 trials were presented with 20% of these being no-
change trials. When the target was present the agent validly cued the target location on 
25% of trials. Participants were instructed to report seeing a change only when they 
were confident that one of the letters had changed. In practice, this meant the 
participant had to know either the location or the identity of the change. If they were 
unsure whether a change had occurred they were instructed to report that they had not 
detected a change.  
Results and discussion 
The overall false alarm rate was 6.2%. Figure 3 shows mean accuracy for the four 
conditions. An ANOVA with validity and visibility as within-participants factors 
revealed a significant main effect of validity, F(1, 17) = 16.9, p < 0.01, = .5, but no 
significant main effect of visibility, F(1, 17) < 1. The interaction was not significant, 
F(1, 17) < 1. As with Experiment 1, these data again show a robust gaze cueing 
effect. However, as was also observed in Experiment 1, the effect was not influenced 
by what the agent could see.  
Experiment 3 
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A growing number of studies have begun to examine visual cognition during real 
social interaction. Such studies have lead to some revisions of what is known about 
visual attention (see Skarratt, Cole, & Kuhn, 2012, for an extensive review). For 
instance, gaze cues were for a long time assumed to be unable to induce inhibition of 
return (IOR; Posner & Cohen, 1984). However, attention shifts generated by 
observing the eyes of a real person sat opposite produce large and robust IOR (e.g., 
Cole, Skarratt, & Billing, 2012; Skarratt, Cole, & Kingstone, 2009; Welsh et al., 
2005). One can argue that issues concerning mental state attributions will particularly 
benefit from experiments that involve interactions with real people. This is based on 
the assumption that it should be easier to compute the mental state of a real person 
compared with a schematic or even photographed representation. In Experiment 3 
therefore we used a real person as the cue who sat facing the participant before 
looking towards one of the two possible target locations (see Figure 4). Physical 
barriers were located either side of the gazer that either allowed the targets to be seen 
or not. This experimental set up also controlled for a possible confound that may have 
existed in Experiments 1 and 2. Although participants in those experiments were 
informed that the barriers either allowed the targets to be visible or not, it is not 
entirely evident that this was inferred. Participants may not have actually believed 
that the barriers rendered the targets non-visible in the occluded conditions. This 
could have been for many reasons including poor depth clues which may not have 
adequately conveyed the intended positions of the targets. Presenting a real person 
adjacent to real barriers ensured no ambiguity as to what the cue person could see.  
Method. 
Participants. Sixteen participants from the University of Essex took part in exchange 
for course credit.  
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 Stimuli and apparatus. The gaze cue person was the third author. He sat approximately 
160 cms from the participant with his back to a projector screen lit from behind. The 
visible part of the screen measured 98 cms in height and 175 cms in length. The targets 
could appear 65 cm to either the left or right of the cue person’s nose. Time was taken 
to ensure that the cue’s nose was always located centrally between the target locations. 
The occluding barriers were extendable screens that measured 85 cms in height and 
were extended to be 40 cms wide. They were positioned on two tables located on either 
side of the cue person. The targets were black letters presented on a uniform white 
screen. Targets were S and H that measured 13 cms in height and 11 cms in width. The 
experiment was driven by a Mac Book Pro and responses made via a Cedrus Button 
Box. A standard LCD monitor was additionally located behind the participants head 
(see below). 
Design and procedure. A within-participant, 2 x 2 factorial design was employed. As 
reported previously the two factors were validity (valid, invalid) and visibility (seeing, 
non-seeing). Each trial effectively began with the cue-person returning their head/gaze 
from the side to look straight ahead and directly into the eyes of the participant. 
Approximately 500 ms after this head return was completed a 3-2-1 visual countdown 
(each 500 ms) was presented to the cue-person via a computer monitor located behind 
the participant (and above their head) and was only visible to the cue-person. This 
countdown occurred at the top of the monitor on either the left or right and informed 
the person-cue which side he should look towards when the countdown was completed. 
The position of the monitor enabled this information to be seen peripherally by the cue-
person, i.e., without the need to look away from the participant. This countdown 
procedure ensured that the person-cue moved his head at almost the same moment on 
each trial. The target appeared exactly 600 ms after the countdown was completed. This 
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exact timing was achieved via the use of a video splitter; a single computer presented 
identical information to both the cue-person’s monitor and participant’s screen. The 
countdown information was of course hidden from the participant (by a black cloth 
hung over the top of the screen). We estimated that the total head movement time was 
approximately 600 ms. Thus the target appeared at about the same time as cue-person 
finished turning their head, or to put another way, 600 ms after the cue person began 
their head movement.  
 
The visibility condition was blocked and presentation order counterbalanced. 
Manipulating visibility was achieved by placing the barriers such that they either 
touched the presentation screen (non-seeing) or they were moved forward by 25 cms 
allowing the person-cue to see the targets. Although it was clearly evident that this 
barrier positioning rendered the targets visible or not, each participant was asked to 
confirm that this was the case. All agreed. Every other aspects of the experiment were 
as reported previously. 
Results and discussion 
Using the same definition as described previously, 2.2% of responses were deemed to 
be outliers and omitted from further analysis. Figure 5 shows mean RTs for each of 
the four conditions. An ANOVA  revealed a significant main effect of validity, F(1, 
15) = 34.6, p < 0.001, = .7, but no significant main effect of visibility, F(1, 15) = 
1.8, p > .19. The interaction was not significant, F(1, 15) < 1
1
. With respect to errors, 
there were no significant main effects of validity, F(1, 15) < 1,  nor visibility, F(1, 15) 
= 2.1, p > .17, and the interaction were also not significant, F(1, 15) = 1.4, p > 0.24. 
Overall, these results concur with those reported in Experiments 1 and 2. A cueing 
effect was observed but was not dependent on what the cueing agent could see.  
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General discussion 
The ability to infer mental states of other individuals is one of the central tenets of 
social cognition. Furthermore, the orienting of one’s attention around a visual scene 
based on the behaviour of another individual (i.e., social attention) can clearly occur 
as a result of a mental state attribution; as when we orient gaze because we would like 
to know what another person is looking at. Across three experiments, we have 
assessed whether an observer needs to attribute ‘seeing’ to a gazer in order for the 
gaze cueing effect to occur. Results have shown robust cueing effect independent of 
whether the gaze cue could see that target or not. These results are clearly discrepant 
with previous studies that observed apparently robust effects of mental state on gaze 
cueing (Nuku & Bekkering, 2008; C. Teufel, Alexis, Clayton, & Davis, 2010; 
Christoph Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010). In the following section  we propose a 
new theoretical model of gaze cueing that explains why mental state attribution 
effects vary across different experimental designs, and makes new predictions about 
the conditions required in order to observe mental state effects on gaze cueing.  
 
A Schema Theory of Gaze Cueing 
 
To understand the boundary conditions of gaze cueing, we propose that gaze cueing 
can be considered within the theory of action control proposed by Norman and 
Shallice (1986) and Cooper and Shallice (2000; in this context ‘actions’ can refer to 
cognitive operations and motor outputs). Central to this view is the idea that action 
control is achieved by the activation of program-like representations called schemas. 
These schemas specify highly learned sequences of actions required to achieve a 
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specific goal. Schemas are activated in a bottom-up fashion in response to the 
properties of the external environment. However, the threshold for activation of a 
schema can be modulated in a top-down manner by using top-down executive 
controla number of factors, including the goals and intentions of the observer (this 
corresponds to an ‘attentional resource’). Once activated, the operations specified by 
the schema are executed automatically (i.e. they are fast, difficult to suppress and do 
not require attention).  With respect to social attention, we propose that repeated 
association between observed gaze direction and relevant stimuli leads to the 
formation of a gaze cueing schema that allows very rapid allocation of processing 
resources to the gazed-at location. This idea is a more formal expression of the view 
that social attention is the consequence of learned associations, rather than an innate 
response to biological stimuli (e.g. Brignani, Guzzon, Marzi, & Miniussi, 2009).  
 
The advantage of placing gaze cueing in this framework is that the factors that 
mediate the selection/deselection of schemas have been precisely specified by Cooper 
and Shallice (2000). Specifically, Cooper and Shallice argue that schemas have an 
activation value, which is the threshold incoming excitatory influences must surpass 
in order to activate the schema. The activation value can be influenced by experience 
such that repeatedly activating a schema lowers is activation value and top-down 
executive control process, which can raise or lower thresholds. The level of excitation 
is determined by the presence of stimuli that match the trigger properties of the 
schema and lateral influences from competing schemas. The probability of a schema 
becoming activated therefore depends on an interaction between the excitatory power 
of incoming sensory stimulation, practice and level of excitatory/inhibitory influence 
being exercised by the central executive.top-down influences  
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The schema theory of gaze cueing suggests a number of predictions about the 
conditions in which gaze cueing should be observed. First, the probability of engaging 
the gaze cueing schema will depend on the the interaction between strength of the 
bottom-up sensory information regarding gaze direction and the availability of 
executive resourcestop-down influences relating to the goals and beliefs of the 
observer. . If cue information is powerful (e.g., it contains unambiguous information 
about gaze direction), it should be very difficult to prevent schema activation, 
regardless of availability of executive resourcesthe top-down influences, so one would 
predict rapid gaze cueing even under conditions where the observer is motivated to 
attend to an uncued location. SecondHowever,, when cue information is weaker (e.g., 
when the cue could be eyes or could be something else, or when gaze direction is 
ambiguous), schema activation is more sensitive to the influences of executive top-
down control. In this case, cueing effect should be reduced or  absent. if the observer 
is motivated to inhibit schema activation.  Secondly, top down modulation of the 
cueing schema should be possible if the observer is sufficiently motivated to inhibit 
schema activation, even when the cue information is unambiguous.  
 
Activation is probabilistic- i.e. on some trial the schema will be activated, leading to a 
fast RT whereas on other trials it will not. If the schema is activated on the majority of 
trials a large and consistent advantage at the cued location will emerge. If it is 
activated on a small number of trials there will be fewer valid trials with a fast RT, 
leading to a smaller mean difference. So, we do propose a threshold model,  
 
These two predictions are consistent with the majority of the empirical data. 
Specifically, studies that use unambiguous eye-gaze cues tend to produce rapid, 
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involuntary gaze cueing even when participants know that gaze direction is non-
predictive (e.g. Driver et al., 1999), and there is contextual information suggesting 
that gaze-direction is irrelevant. However, when some ambiguity regarding gaze 
direction is introduced by obscuring the eyes and using head-gaze as a cue (e.g., Nuku 
& Bekkering 2008; Teufel et al., 2009; Samson, et al. 2010), or making the cues status 
as eyes ambiguous (Ristic & Kingstone, 2005)  gaze cueing effects are modulated by 
top-down knowledge that  the cue can or cannot ‘see’.  
 
 
 
 
Third, the reflexive gaze cueing effect should follow a developmental trajectory, such 
that gaze cueing in infants and young children should be slow and under conscious 
control, but that as the schema becomes established the cueing effect should become 
increasing fast but resistant to cognitive control. Thus, young children should show 
weak cueing effects, particularly under conditions of high cognitive load, whereas 
older children and adults should be unaffected by cognitive load (this second 
prediction is consistent with recent data from Law et al., 2009).  There should also be 
a systematic reduction in the latency at which cueing effects can be observed as age 
increases. Fourth,  
 
 
 
modulation of the gaze cueing schema depends on the availability of executive 
resources, so reducing the availability of these resources by imposing cognitive load 
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or engaging in ego-depletion (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; 
Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000) should limit the capacity for schema control. 
The model therefore predicts that the modulation of gaze cueing by mental state 
attribution will be reduced or abolished under conditions of high cognitive load (see 
Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, & Dux, 2012, for support). Fifth, the usual response to 
seeing averted gaze is to orient the eyes to the gazed-at location so a gaze cueing 
schema may produce concurrent activation of the oculomotor system, and the usual 
response to seeing averted gaze is to orient the eyes to the gaze-at location. However, 
this activation does not have a functional role in the shift of attention. This prediction 
is consistent with recent evidence that gaze-cues engage the oculomotor system 
(Grosbras, Laird, & Paus, 2005; Kuhn & Kingstone, 2009; Ricciardelli, Bricolo, 
Aglioti, & Chelazzi, 2002), but that this activation is not required for gaze cueing 
(Friesen & Kingstone, 2003). Additionally, there is nothing special about the social 
aspect of gaze-cues. The model predicts that any over learned cue-target association 
can become encoded as a schema and thus show the same pattern of results as gaze 
cueing. This prediction is consistent with the well established finding that arrow cues 
trigger attention shifts that are behaviourally similar to those triggered by gaze cues 
(Ristic, Friesen, and Kingstone 2002; Stevens et al., 2008; Tipples 2002), and recent 
evidence that overtraining any arbitrary association between stimulus property and 
spatial location can produce rapid, involuntary shifts of attention (Guzzon, Brignani, 
Miniussi, & Marzi, 2010)).  
 
Finally, the schema theory of gaze cueing explains why the phenomenon is observed 
in persons with autism (Leekam, Hunnisett, & Moore, 1998), a finding hard to explain 
from a mental state perspective. Specifically, as the cueing effect is the product of 
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learning stimulus-response associations, and this process is intact in autism, people 
with autism should show reflexive cueing, assuming they have been exposed to 
associations between gaze and relevant stimuli during development. However, these 
participants should experience problems with the modulation of gaze cueing in 
response to the mental states of an avatar, because they do not attribute mental states 
to the avatar (they assume it sees what they see), so are not motivated to exert control 
over schema activation. 
 
In summary, we have found that the attribution of ‘seeing’ is not necessary for gaze 
cueing to occur. The irrelevance of an observed agent’s point-of-view was maintained 
for both depicted and real life faces, and in tasks that index attention using both RT 
and response accuracy. We have proposed a Schema Theory of Gaze cueing, which 
argues that mental state attribution can only influence reflexive gaze cueing when the 
information about gaze-direction is ambiguous. This approach accounts for the failure 
to observe effects of mental state attribution in the current study, the positive results 
of previous studies, and makes clear predictions about the results of future empirical 
studies.  
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                                                       Footnote 
1) In the mental attribution studies of Teufel et al. (2010), data was analysed via an 
“inverse efficiency” index first proposed by Townsend and Ashby (1978). In this 
analysis RT is divided by accuracy. For all our RT experiments we present results 
based on conventional analysis in which RT is not dependent on accuracy. We did 
however reanalyse our two RT gaze cueing experiments (i.e., Experiments 1 and 3) 
with respect to inverse efficiency. The results were largely the same. Importantly, all 
validity/visibility interactions were non-significant (all ps > .2) 
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                                                  Figure Legends 
Figure 1. Stimuli used in Experiment 1. The example shows a valid trial in the 
‘seeing’ condition.  
Figure 2. Mean RT and error rates from Experiment 1 together with standard error 
bars. 
Figure 3. Results from Experiment 2. Standard error bars are also shown.  
Figure 4. The set-up for Experiment 4. The image shows a valid trial in which the 
barrier occludes the cue’s visibility of the target. The inset image shows what the 
person-cue saw during the first part of each trial. 
Figure 5. Mean RT and error rates from Experiment 3. Standard error bars are also 
shown. 
 
                                                          END 
 
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego 
depletion: Is the active self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 74(5), 1252-1265. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1252 
Baumeister, R. F., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (2000). Ego depletion: A resource 
model of volition, self-regulation, and controlled processing. Social Cognition, 
18(2), 130-150. doi: 10.1521/soco.2000.18.2.130 
Brignani, D., Guzzon, D., Marzi, C. A., & Miniussi, C. (2009). Attentional orienting 
induced by arrows and eye-gaze compared with an endogenous cue. [Review]. 
Neuropsychologia, 47(2), 370-381. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.09.011 
Friesen, C. K., & Kingstone, A. (2003). Covert and overt orienting to gaze direction 
cues and the effects of fixation offset. [Article]. Neuroreport, 14(3), 489-493. 
doi: 10.1097/01.wnr.0000058776.36017.5d 
Grosbras, M. N., Laird, A. R., & Paus, T. (2005). Cortical regions involved in eye 
movements, shifts of attention, and gaze perception. Human Brain Mapping, 
25(1), 140-154. doi: 10.1002/hbm.20145 
Guzzon, D., Brignani, D., Miniussi, C., & Marzi, C. A. (2010). Orienting of attention 
with eye and arrow cues and the effect of overtraining. Acta Psychologica, 
134(3), 353-362. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2010.03.008 
Kuhn, G., & Kingstone, A. (2009). Look away! Eyes and arrows engage oculomotor 
responses automatically. [Article]. Attention Perception & Psychophysics, 
71(2), 314-327. doi: 10.3758/app.71.2.314 
 40 
Nuku, P., & Bekkering, H. (2008). Joint attention: Inferring what others perceive (and 
don't perceive). Consciousness and Cognition, 17(1), 339-349.  
Rensink, R. A., O' Regan, J. K., & Clark, J. J. (1997). To see or not to see: The need 
for attention to perceive changes in scenes. Psychological Science, 8(5), 368-
373.  
Ricciardelli, P., Bricolo, E., Aglioti, S. M., & Chelazzi, L. (2002). My eyes want to 
look where your eyes are looking: Exploring the tendency to imitate another 
individual's gaze. Neuroreport, 13(17), 2259-2264. doi: 10.1097/00001756-
200212030-00018 
Ristic, J., & Kingstone, A. (2005). Taking control of reflexive social attention. 
Cognition, 94(3), B55-B65.  
Smith, D. T., & Schenk, T. (2008). Reflexive attention attenuates change blindness 
(but only briefly) Perception & Psychophysics, 70(3), 489-495.  
Teufel, C., Alexis, D. M., Clayton, N. S., & Davis, G. (2010). Mental-state attribution 
drives rapid, reflexive gaze following. [Article]. Attention Perception & 
Psychophysics, 72(3), 695-705. doi: 10.3758/app.72.3.695 
Teufel, C., Fletcher, P. C., & Davis, G. (2010). Seeing other minds: attributed mental 
states influence perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(8), 376-382.  
 
 
